On 22 Apr 2004, jamal wrote:
> Unless its a private network with locked vaults for the pipes, any
> network is vulnerable. I am not trying to downplay the relevance of
> this; all i am saying is it may a little overhyped with the media being
> involved. Its infact harder to create this attack compared to a simple
> SYN attack.
Not quite. With a SYN you have to respond with exactly the same sequence
number as attacking host in order to establish connection. With RST, your
sequence number needs to be +- rwin in order to kill the connection. That
significantly reduces search space.
> Unless i misunderstood: You need someone/thing to see about 64K packets
> within a single flow to make the predicition so the attack is succesful.
> Sure to have access to such capability is to be in a hostile path, no?
No, you do not need to see any packet.
> > And it's not BGP specific. You might be able to use this attack to
> > split IRC networks, too. However, it's a bit harder in this case
> > because IRC servers usually use more random source ports.
> Any long lived flow with close to fixed ports. FTP from kernel.org could
> be vulnerable - get a better client and its just becomes a nuisance. 80%
> of the internet traffic is still TCP/HTTP1.0 which is very short lived
> (there could be changes lately - these are numbers from a while back)
> i.e you wont see more than 8 packets i.e it is highly unlikely your
> traffic there is affected even if you used fixed ports.
Inter-provider BGP is long-lived with close to fixed ports, which is why
it has caused quite a stir.
Nevertheless, number of packets to kill the session is still *large*
(under "best-case" for attacker, you need to send 2^30 packets)...