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References: [ +subject:/^(?:^\s*(re|sv|fwd|fw)[\[\]\d]*[:>-]+\s*)*RST\s+business\s*$/: 8 ]

Total 8 documents matching your query.

1. RST business (score: 1)
Author: Garzik <jgarzik@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2004 22:59:11 -0700
Looking at the hype around 'TCP vulnerability' the following occured to me, and I wonder if it makes any sense - A host may recieve legitimate RST packet only in response to something that it has pre
/archives/netdev/2004-04/msg00377.html (9,561 bytes)

2. Re: RST business (score: 1)
Author: ly Tarreau <w@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 16:38:34 +0930
We're seeing the results of that hype. Lots of peers ringing the NOC to urgently arrange TCP MD5 authentication of their BGP sessions. It looks like lots of managers have read the press and issued di
/archives/netdev/2004-04/msg00378.html (8,752 bytes)

3. Re: RST business (score: 1)
Author: i@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 08:17:45 -0700
Yeah, sure, I understand that. But how realistis is this synchronization loss ? Ie I cannot immediately think of a sequence of events, which would result in two sides both in Established state with d
/archives/netdev/2004-04/msg00394.html (10,943 bytes)

4. Re: RST business (score: 1)
Author: <sri@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 09:11:42 -0500
If one of the potential causes for RST is that SEQ/ACK synchronization has been lost, then you can't do this. Alex Pankratov wrote: Looking at the hype around 'TCP vulnerability' the following occure
/archives/netdev/2004-04/msg00410.html (10,212 bytes)

5. RST business (score: 1)
Author: Alex Pankratov <ap@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2004 22:59:11 -0700
Looking at the hype around 'TCP vulnerability' the following occured to me, and I wonder if it makes any sense - A host may recieve legitimate RST packet only in response to something that it has pre
/archives/netdev/2004-04/msg00911.html (9,031 bytes)

6. Re: RST business (score: 1)
Author: Glen Turner <glen.turner@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 16:38:34 +0930
We're seeing the results of that hype. Lots of peers ringing the NOC to urgently arrange TCP MD5 authentication of their BGP sessions. It looks like lots of managers have read the press and issued di
/archives/netdev/2004-04/msg00912.html (8,800 bytes)

7. Re: RST business (score: 1)
Author: Alex Pankratov <apankrat@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 08:17:45 -0700
Yeah, sure, I understand that. But how realistis is this synchronization loss ? Ie I cannot immediately think of a sequence of events, which would result in two sides both in Established state with d
/archives/netdev/2004-04/msg00928.html (10,546 bytes)

8. Re: RST business (score: 1)
Author: Steve Modica <modica@xxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 09:11:42 -0500
If one of the potential causes for RST is that SEQ/ACK synchronization has been lost, then you can't do this. Looking at the hype around 'TCP vulnerability' the following occured to me, and I wonder
/archives/netdev/2004-04/msg00944.html (9,810 bytes)


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