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References: [ +subject:/^(?:^\s*(re|sv|fwd|fw)[\[\]\d]*[:>-]+\s*)*Don\'t\s+allow\s+mapped\s+address\s+after\s+binding\s+to\s+ipv4\.\s*$/: 8 ]

Total 8 documents matching your query.

1. Don't allow mapped address after binding to ipv4. (score: 1)
Author: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 04 Aug 2000 12:22:57 +0900
Hi forks, linux-2.2.16 and linux-2.4.0-test5 allow to let an application bind an inet6 socket sd6 to an address / a port that is already bound to inet socket sd4. For example, the 2nd step below shou
/archives/netdev/2000-08/msg00002.html (10,045 bytes)

2. Re: Don't allow mapped address after binding to ipv4. (score: 1)
Author: kuznet@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2000 19:38:04 +0400 (MSK DST)
Yeah... Ugly. 8) But we have no choice. Thank you. Alexey
/archives/netdev/2000-08/msg00022.html (7,635 bytes)

3. Re: Don't allow mapped address after binding to ipv4. (score: 1)
Author: Alan Cox <alan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2000 18:40:20 +0100 (BST)
Does this not leave us open to 'binding closer' type attacks like NFS packet theft ?
/archives/netdev/2000-08/msg00023.html (7,853 bytes)

4. Re: Don't allow mapped address after binding to ipv4. (score: 1)
Author: kuznet@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2000 22:26:43 +0400 (MSK DST)
Seems, with this patch theft is impossible. Without this patch IPv6 can steal sockets used by IP, indeed. Test !sk2->rcv_saddr prevents binding to place used both by IPv6 and IP wildcard. The proble
/archives/netdev/2000-08/msg00024.html (8,488 bytes)

5. Don't allow mapped address after binding to ipv4. (score: 1)
Author: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 04 Aug 2000 12:22:57 +0900
Hi forks, linux-2.2.16 and linux-2.4.0-test5 allow to let an application bind an inet6 socket sd6 to an address / a port that is already bound to inet socket sd4. For example, the 2nd step below shou
/archives/netdev/2000-08/msg00131.html (10,060 bytes)

6. Re: Don't allow mapped address after binding to ipv4. (score: 1)
Author: kuznet@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2000 19:38:04 +0400 (MSK DST)
Hello! Yeah... Ugly. 8) But we have no choice. Thank you. Alexey
/archives/netdev/2000-08/msg00151.html (7,667 bytes)

7. Re: Don't allow mapped address after binding to ipv4. (score: 1)
Author: Alan Cox <alan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2000 18:40:20 +0100 (BST)
Does this not leave us open to 'binding closer' type attacks like NFS packet theft ?
/archives/netdev/2000-08/msg00152.html (7,924 bytes)

8. Re: Don't allow mapped address after binding to ipv4. (score: 1)
Author: kuznet@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Sat, 5 Aug 2000 22:26:43 +0400 (MSK DST)
Hello! Seems, with this patch theft is impossible. Without this patch IPv6 can steal sockets used by IP, indeed. Test !sk2->rcv_saddr prevents binding to place used both by IPv6 and IP wildcard. The
/archives/netdev/2000-08/msg00153.html (8,513 bytes)


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