The recent thread on NLMSG_OK has reminded me about an old problem with NETLINK. The problem is that any user on the system can launch a DoS attack on any NETLINK application by flooding its NETLINK
I would've thought that it shouldn't break anything. But let me have a look around and get back to you. Cheers, -- Visit Openswan at http://www.openswan.org/ Email: Herbert Xu ~{PmV>HI~} <herbert@xxx
Do you mean the restriction sort of made in AF_UNIX SOCK_DGRAM: a connected socket receives messages only from its destination? I think this is safe. It was not done because netlink sockets were exp
Exactly. Another example would be UDP over IP. So it should be harmless to introduce this new semantics. That's kind of a good thing since it means that existing applications are less likely to call
Great. I'll code it up then. Cheers, -- Visit Openswan at http://www.openswan.org/ Email: Herbert Xu ~{PmV>HI~} <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key:
Actually that doesn't quite work. Users are allowed to bind to any non-zero address including -1. Besides, we already have sock->sk_state and socket->state which are perfect for this. So here is a pa
OK. Can you give me a code path that allows sk_socket to be NULL at this point? Thanks, -- Visit Openswan at http://www.openswan.org/ Email: Herbert Xu ~{PmV>HI~} <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Home P
Thanks for the example. Here is a version that uses sk_state instead. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Cheers, -- Visit Openswan at http://www.openswan.org/ Email: Herbert Xu ~
Why don't you combine the two "ERR_PTR(-ECONNREFUSED)" tests into one test like: if ((nlk->pid == 0 && !nlk->data_ready) || (sock->sk_state == NELTINK_CONNECTED && nlk->dst_pid != nlk_sk(ssk)->pid))
Well at least under i386, gcc (3.3.4) is smart enough to merge these common exit paths. But yes we could merge them. What about the following incremental patch? -- Visit Openswan at http://www.opensw
Hi: The recent thread on NLMSG_OK has reminded me about an old problem with NETLINK. The problem is that any user on the system can launch a DoS attack on any NETLINK application by flooding its NETL
I would've thought that it shouldn't break anything. But let me have a look around and get back to you. Cheers, -- Visit Openswan at http://www.openswan.org/ Email: Herbert Xu ~{PmV>HI~} <herbert@xxx
Hello! Do you mean the restriction sort of made in AF_UNIX SOCK_DGRAM: a connected socket receives messages only from its destination? I think this is safe. It was not done because netlink sockets we