| To: | Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxx> |
|---|---|
| Subject: | Re: immutable etc. |
| From: | Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxx> |
| Date: | Thu, 7 Dec 2000 19:19:27 +0100 |
| Cc: | Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxx>, Timothy Shimmin <tes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, graichen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, linux-xfs@xxxxxxxxxxx |
| In-reply-to: | <20001207191234.A30275@caldera.de>; from hch@caldera.de on Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 07:12:34PM +0100 |
| References: | <news2mail-90gun7$srf$2@mate.bln.innominate.de> <200012070625.RAA34103@boing.melbourne.sgi.com> <20001207093517.A5515@caldera.de> <20001207163711.A27514@gruyere.muc.suse.de> <20001207191234.A30275@caldera.de> |
| Sender: | owner-linux-xfs@xxxxxxxxxxx |
| User-agent: | Mutt/1.2.5i |
On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 07:12:34PM +0100, Christoph Hellwig wrote: > a) it's at least harder for the attacker > b) for a even more secure system you will just disable that too > > > (e.g. working IMMUTABLE normally implies non working x server). > > No. It does. I recently did a study for the changes required for a secure (how to plug all holes that could be used to change kernel memory in a controlled environment), and the X server was one of the most prominent (unless you go to unaccelerated X, which is not acceptable) There were lots of others too. > > > Commonly accessed binaries like the ld.so can also be just modified in > > core. > > Sure. But you probably want to disable access to /dev/kmem, too Disabling /dev/kmem and module loading is trivial. The problem when you want to do a full job is auditing every weird ioctl and /proc function hiding in some device driver if they do not allow to modify foreign memory for root. A lot of them do. -Andi |
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