Re: [PATCH] Add audit uid to netlink credentials

[Chris Wright <chrisw@xxxxxxxx>]

* David Woodhouse (dwmw2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx) wrote:
> On Wed, 2005-02-09 at 15:38 -0800, Chris Wright wrote:
> >I just don't see it making sense to add another credential for a special
> >case.  The signal code already peaks into the siginfo struct when queueing
> >a signal to make sure some user isn't trying to send si_code == SI_KERNEL
> >or similar.  Perhaps audit could do that with it's own payload during send.
> >No matter how we slice it, it's a special case.
> 
> I'm not entirely sure the check is needed anyway. This is a trusted
> application sending audit messages. Why shouldn't it be permitted to log
> auditable events which were triggered by someone _else_? 

Then it comes back to the question of how to protect loginuid.  If it
can be spoofed by someone with CAP_AUDIT_WRITE, then it shouldn't be
write protected by CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.

thanks,
-chris
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