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Re: [PATCH] Add audit uid to netlink credentials

To: Linux Audit Discussion <linux-audit@xxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Add audit uid to netlink credentials
From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wed, 09 Feb 2005 23:56:09 +0000
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, netdev@xxxxxxxxxxx, davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, kuznet@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
In-reply-to: <20050209153816.B24171@build.pdx.osdl.net>
References: <20050204165840.GA2320@IBM-BWN8ZTBWA01.austin.ibm.com> <1107958621.19262.524.camel@hades.cambridge.redhat.com> <1107960659.4837.9.camel@serge> <1107973381.17568.97.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <20050209103747.Y24171@build.pdx.osdl.net> <1107974448.17568.108.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <20050209153816.B24171@build.pdx.osdl.net>
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On Wed, 2005-02-09 at 15:38 -0800, Chris Wright wrote:
>> So you also think it should be in the payload?  That would require
>> security_netlink_send to dig into the payload if we wanted to control
>> who can specify other loginuids, as Serge noted.
>
>I just don't see it making sense to add another credential for a special
>case.  The signal code already peaks into the siginfo struct when queueing
>a signal to make sure some user isn't trying to send si_code == SI_KERNEL
>or similar.  Perhaps audit could do that with it's own payload during send.
>No matter how we slice it, it's a special case.

I'm not entirely sure the check is needed anyway. This is a trusted
application sending audit messages. Why shouldn't it be permitted to log
auditable events which were triggered by someone _else_? 

If we want to audit the actions of the userspace logging dÃmon itself
and see what it sends, then we can quite happily do so within the audit
framework. That's a _different_ issue, surely?

-- 
dwmw2


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