Subject: [Fwd: [PATCH] xfstests: limit OP_PUNCH_HOLE operations to the file
 size]
From: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>
Reply-To: <aelder@sgi.com>
To: <xfs@oss.sgi.com>
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Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2011 17:41:38 -0500
Message-ID: <1318027298.2810.82.camel@doink>
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Review?

-------- Forwarded Message --------
From: Alex Elder <aelder@americas.sgi.com>
To: xfs@oss.sgi.com
Subject: [PATCH] xfstests: limit OP_PUNCH_HOLE operations to the file
size
Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2011 15:18:06 -0500

Before punching a hole in a file, TRIM_OFF_LEN() calls
TRIM_OFF_LEN() in order to make sure the offset and size
used are in a reasonable range.  But currently the range
it's limited to is maxfilelen, which allows the offset
(and therefore offset + len) to be beyond EOF.

Later, do_punch_hole() ignores any request that starts beyond
EOF, so we might as well limit requests to the file size.

It appears that a hole punch request that starts within a
file but whose length extends beyond it is treated simply
as a hole punch up to EOF.  So there's no harm in limiting
the end of a hole punch request to the file size either.

Therefore, use TRIM_OFF_LEN() to put both the the offset
and length of a request within the file size for hole
punch requests.

Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>

---
 ltp/fsx.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

Index: b/ltp/fsx.c
===================================================================
--- a/ltp/fsx.c
+++ b/ltp/fsx.c
@@ -1085,7 +1085,7 @@ test(void)
 		break;
 
 	case OP_PUNCH_HOLE:
-		TRIM_OFF_LEN(offset, size, maxfilelen);
+		TRIM_OFF_LEN(offset, size, file_size);
 		do_punch_hole(offset, size);
 		break;
 	default: