Return to exthdrs_core.c CVS log

Up to [Development] / linux-2.6-xfs / net / ipv6

Merge up to 2.6.5

/*
 * IPv6 library code, needed by static components when full IPv6 support is
 * not configured or static.
 */
#include <net/ipv6.h>

/* 
 * find out if nexthdr is a well-known extension header or a protocol
 */

int ipv6_ext_hdr(u8 nexthdr)
{
	/* 
	 * find out if nexthdr is an extension header or a protocol
	 */
	return ( (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_HOP)	||
		 (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_ROUTING)	||
		 (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT)	||
		 (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_AUTH)	||
		 (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_NONE)	||
		 (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_DEST) );
}

/*
 * Skip any extension headers. This is used by the ICMP module.
 *
 * Note that strictly speaking this conflicts with RFC 2460 4.0:
 * ...The contents and semantics of each extension header determine whether 
 * or not to proceed to the next header.  Therefore, extension headers must
 * be processed strictly in the order they appear in the packet; a
 * receiver must not, for example, scan through a packet looking for a
 * particular kind of extension header and process that header prior to
 * processing all preceding ones.
 * 
 * We do exactly this. This is a protocol bug. We can't decide after a
 * seeing an unknown discard-with-error flavour TLV option if it's a 
 * ICMP error message or not (errors should never be send in reply to
 * ICMP error messages).
 * 
 * But I see no other way to do this. This might need to be reexamined
 * when Linux implements ESP (and maybe AUTH) headers.
 * --AK
 *
 * This function parses (probably truncated) exthdr set "hdr"
 * of length "len". "nexthdrp" initially points to some place,
 * where type of the first header can be found.
 *
 * It skips all well-known exthdrs, and returns pointer to the start
 * of unparsable area i.e. the first header with unknown type.
 * If it is not NULL *nexthdr is updated by type/protocol of this header.
 *
 * NOTES: - if packet terminated with NEXTHDR_NONE it returns NULL.
 *        - it may return pointer pointing beyond end of packet,
 *	    if the last recognized header is truncated in the middle.
 *        - if packet is truncated, so that all parsed headers are skipped,
 *	    it returns NULL.
 *	  - First fragment header is skipped, not-first ones
 *	    are considered as unparsable.
 *	  - ESP is unparsable for now and considered like
 *	    normal payload protocol.
 *	  - Note also special handling of AUTH header. Thanks to IPsec wizards.
 *
 * --ANK (980726)
 */

int ipv6_skip_exthdr(const struct sk_buff *skb, int start, u8 *nexthdrp, int len)
{
	u8 nexthdr = *nexthdrp;

	while (ipv6_ext_hdr(nexthdr)) {
		struct ipv6_opt_hdr hdr;
		int hdrlen;

		if (len < (int)sizeof(struct ipv6_opt_hdr))
			return -1;
		if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_NONE)
			return -1;
		if (skb_copy_bits(skb, start, &hdr, sizeof(hdr)))
			BUG();
		if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT) {
			unsigned short frag_off;
			if (skb_copy_bits(skb,
					  start+offsetof(struct frag_hdr,
							 frag_off),
					  &frag_off,
					  sizeof(frag_off))) {
				return -1;
			}

			if (ntohs(frag_off) & ~0x7)
				break;
			hdrlen = 8;
		} else if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_AUTH)
			hdrlen = (hdr.hdrlen+2)<<2; 
		else
			hdrlen = ipv6_optlen(&hdr); 

		nexthdr = hdr.nexthdr;
		len -= hdrlen;
		start += hdrlen;
	}

	*nexthdrp = nexthdr;
	return start;
}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(ipv6_ext_hdr);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ipv6_skip_exthdr);