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Re: [PATCH 5/5] fs: Avoid premature clearing of capabilities

To: Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/5] fs: Avoid premature clearing of capabilities
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2016 01:29:12 -0700
Cc: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Miklos Szeredi <miklos@xxxxxxxxxx>, xfs@xxxxxxxxxxx, "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@xxxxxxxxxx>, linux-fsdevel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@xxxxxxxxx>, ceph-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Delivered-to: xfs@xxxxxxxxxxx
In-reply-to: <1470223689-17783-6-git-send-email-jack@xxxxxxx>
References: <1470223689-17783-1-git-send-email-jack@xxxxxxx> <1470223689-17783-6-git-send-email-jack@xxxxxxx>
User-agent: Mutt/1.6.1 (2016-04-27)
On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 01:28:09PM +0200, Jan Kara wrote:
> Currently, notify_change() clears capabilities or IMA attributes by
> calling security_inode_killpriv() before calling into ->setattr. Thus it
> happens before any other permission checks in inode_change_ok() and user
> is thus allowed to trigger clearing of capabilities or IMA attributes
> for any file he can look up e.g. by calling chown for that file. This is
> unexpected and can lead to user DoSing a system.
> 
> Fix the problem by calling security_inode_killpriv() at the end of
> inode_change_ok() instead of from notify_change(). At that moment we are
> sure user has permissions to do the requested change.

Looks fine,

Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxx>

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