Re: XFS security fix never sent to -stable?

[Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 6:00 PM, Dave Chinner <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 08:10:51PM -0500, Josh Boyer wrote:
>> On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 8:03 PM, Dave Chinner <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> > Security processes are not something that should be hidden away in
>> > it's own private corner - if there's a problem upstream needs to
>> > take action on, then direct contact with upstream is necessary. We
>> > need to know about security issues - even ones that are classified
>> > post-commit as security issues - so we are operating with full
>> > knowledge of the issues in our code and the impact of our fixes....
>>
>> Agreed.  I'm going to interpret your comments at being directed to the
>> general audience because otherwise you're just shooting the messenger
>> :).
>
> Right, they are not aimed at you - they are aimed at those on the
> security side of the fence. I'm tired of learning about CVEs in XFS
> code through chinese whispers and/or luck.

Mostly I try to shield anyone not interested in CVEs from the boring
process, and try to focus on just getting things marked as needing to
go into stable. I don't think anyone needs to read the oss-security
list if they don't want to.

In this case, the fix Dan sent was part of a larger collection of
security issues reported by Nico. I think the communication error here
was Dan accidentally forgetting to add the Cc: stable tag. But beyond
that, it was sent to the xfs list and Cc: to security, so I'm not sure
it's fair to say it was hidden away. :)

Besides the missing Cc: stable tag, what should future patch senders
do to call attention to an issue being a security problem at the time
it is being reported?

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security