Check for CAP_SYS_ADMIN since the caller can truncate preallocated
blocks from files they do not own nor have write access to. A more
fine grained access check was considered: require the caller to
specify their own uid/gid and to use inode_permission to check for
write, but this would not catch the case of an inode not reachable
via path traversal from the callers mount namespace.
Add check for read-only filesystem to free eofblocks ioctl.
Signed-off-by: Dwight Engen <dwight.engen@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
index 6e72eff..b1990ac 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
@@ -1613,6 +1613,12 @@ xfs_file_ioctl(
struct xfs_fs_eofblocks eofb;
struct xfs_eofblocks keofb;
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (IS_RDONLY(inode))
+ return -XFS_ERROR(EROFS);
+
if (copy_from_user(&eofb, arg, sizeof(eofb)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
--
1.8.1.4
|