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[PATCH 47/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the XFS filesystem

To: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [PATCH 47/59] CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the XFS filesystem
From: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2008 14:49:44 +0100
Cc: linux-security-module@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>, Serge Hallyn <serue@xxxxxxxxxx>, xfs@xxxxxxxxxxx
In-reply-to: <20080827134541.19980.61042.stgit@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Organization: Red Hat UK Ltd. Registered Address: Red Hat UK Ltd, Amberley Place, 107-111 Peascod Street, Windsor, Berkshire, SI4 1TE, United Kingdom. Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903
References: <20080827134541.19980.61042.stgit@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sender: xfs-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxx
User-agent: StGIT/0.14.3
Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: xfs@xxxxxxxxxxx
---

 fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h |    2 +-
 fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c            |    6 +++---
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)


diff --git a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h
index 652721c..293043a 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h
+++ b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_cred.h
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
  * Credentials
  */
 typedef struct cred {
-       /* EMPTY */
+       /* EMPTY */
 } cred_t;
 
 extern struct cred *sys_cred;
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c
index b2f639a..91d6933 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ xfs_acl_allow_set(
                return ENOTDIR;
        if (vp->i_sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
                return EROFS;
-       if (XFS_I(vp)->i_d.di_uid != current->fsuid && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
+       if (XFS_I(vp)->i_d.di_uid != current_fsuid() && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
                return EPERM;
        return 0;
 }
@@ -413,13 +413,13 @@ xfs_acl_access(
                switch (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
                case ACL_USER_OBJ:
                        seen_userobj = 1;
-                       if (fuid != current->fsuid)
+                       if (fuid != current_fsuid())
                                continue;
                        matched.ae_tag = ACL_USER_OBJ;
                        matched.ae_perm = allows;
                        break;
                case ACL_USER:
-                       if (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_id != current->fsuid)
+                       if (fap->acl_entry[i].ae_id != current_fsuid())
                                continue;
                        matched.ae_tag = ACL_USER;
                        matched.ae_perm = allows;


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