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Re: immutable etc.

To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: immutable etc.
From: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2000 19:19:27 +0100
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxx>, Timothy Shimmin <tes@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, graichen@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, linux-xfs@xxxxxxxxxxx
In-reply-to: <20001207191234.A30275@xxxxxxxxxx>; from hch@xxxxxxxxxx on Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 07:12:34PM +0100
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On Thu, Dec 07, 2000 at 07:12:34PM +0100, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
>   a) it's at least harder for the attacker
>   b) for a even more secure system you will just disable that too
> 
> > (e.g. working IMMUTABLE normally implies non working x server).
> 
> No.

It does.  I recently did a study for the changes required for a secure
(how to plug all holes that could be used to change kernel memory in a
controlled environment), and the X server was one of the most prominent 
(unless you go to unaccelerated X, which is not acceptable)  
There were lots of others too. 

> 
> > Commonly accessed binaries like the ld.so can also be just modified in 
> > core. 
> 
> Sure.  But you probably want to disable access to /dev/kmem, too

Disabling /dev/kmem and module loading is trivial. The problem when you 
want to do a full job is auditing every weird ioctl and /proc function hiding 
in some device driver if they do not allow to modify foreign memory for root. 
A lot of them do. 



-Andi

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